INTRODUCTION In Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making it Work
Better, John Braithwaite wrote an eye-catching phrase: regulatory capitalism represents the "reality of hybridity between the privatization of the public and publicization of the private." 1 The privatization of the public had been well documented, 2 but the idea of publicization of the private appeared to hold new promise. 3 I had spotted Braithwaite's new optimism earlier in a 2006 working paper, when he admitted that he had been concerned about the neoliberal shift toward privatization, 4 even though he had been endorsing the self-governance of private actors for some time. 5 But now (as of 2006), he was convinced that his fears regarding neoliberalism were excessive, and that it was merely a stage of "regulatory capitalism." 6 In April of 2013, Braithwaite released a new working paper that further extrapolates on publicization, explaining that it means "the percolation of public law values into private law and into corporate selfregulation [, including] the most critical public law values such as transparency, accountability, stakeholder voice and separations of powers." 7 Jody Freeman, the originator of this idea, described publicization as a process by which "private actors increasingly commit themselves to traditionally public goals as the price of access to lucrative opportunities . . . that might otherwise be provided directly by the state." 8 However, in the decade since Freeman hypothesized that this publicization would occur, there has been little evidence of such a transformation. 9 For better or worse, business actors do not appear to be any more or less imbued with the spirit of public service than in the past, leaving questions as to whether recent regulatory experimentation has come at the expense of the long-term integrity of governance. 10 Both the collapse of Enron and the credit crisis have been, in large part, attributable to the regulatory failures caused by the decisions of forprofit "gatekeepers," 11 such as Arthur Andersen 12 and Standard & Poor's. 13 These "gatekeepers" were enjoying the sort of lucrative opportunities that Freeman had envisioned but failed to adequately publicize as she predicted.
In light of the continued interest in the idea of publicization, this article offers some considerations that might be taken into account when attempting to evaluate its potential. To do so, this article, in part, takes a second look at the literatures supporting "new governance" initiatives that expose the publicization of the private. New governance is an umbrella term for theories of governance that encourage regulatory architects to marry the best of both the public and private orderings. 14 It celebrates a "blurring" of public and private functions within areas of regulation. 15 The publicization dimension of new governance rhetoric invokes an out of focus image of the democratic delegation of power to for-profit agents, who, it is assumed, will exercise this power in a benevolent and efficient manner. For many regulatory scholars, with market failure to their left and regulatory failure to their right, publicization of the private represents a best-case metaphor whereby governance enjoys the optimal balance between the functional efficiencies of decentered actors 16 and the integrity of idealized public servants. But again, this vision of publicization is out of focus and lacking in detail. This may be a serious problem if it creates a false promise of a panacea for the social ills attributed to privatization-such as the "democratic deficit" it creates. 17 This article invites scholars to reconsider whether such blurring of public and private functions should be encouraged, and argues that the publicization of for-profit activities is a goal that is unlikely to be achieved. In light of Freeman's "ideal" of publicization, this article suggests that the best-case scenario for new governance may be merely the privatization of the public without the publicization of the private. And if this is the case then new governance, and its call for a further blurring of public and private functions, merits a critical re-evaluation.
Part I of this article provides an introduction to some of the literatures that inform new governance. Part II explores the normative strength of corporate governance to resist publicization. Part III looks at the challenges that technocratic narratives pose to publicization within both public and private governance. This article concludes by suggesting that, based on the arguments presented, for-profit actors will not publicize as the literature suggests. This conclusion invites further discussion as to the possibility of a more directed process that engineers a reconstitution of the public and private in light of the challenges facing modern governance, rather than just leaving it to the fortunes of market-driven "spontaneous evolution." 810-11 (2007) . Of course, the concerns over the "democratic deficit" exist beyond privatization issues and are considered by those who are concerned about the entire project of new governance. See, e.g., GOVERNANCE AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 307-11 (Victor Bekkers et al. eds., 2007).
I. THE FOUNDATION FOR NEW GOVERNANCE
It is yet to be determined how new governance 18 will play out. 19 Thus, its merits are difficult to assess. The literature-if it is a single literature-is fragmented: collaborative, 20 incentive-based, 21 reflexive, 22 responsive, 23 and decentered 24 notions of governance are not necessarily mindful of each other and appear not to be moving toward a single cohesive position. Attempts to synthesize the new governance 18 . See Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 65, 65 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012), for a definition of new governance. " [N] ew governance has emerged as a school of thought that focuses on the significance of institutional design and culture for effective and legitimate regulation. The development of new governance theory marks a paradigm shift from the old regulation by command and control to a regulatory governance model, signifying a collective intellectual and programmatic project for a new legal regime. New governance offers a vision of law and policy that draws on the comparative strengths of both private and public stakeholders and highlights the multiple ways in which the various actors in a society contribute to the acts of ordering social fields. New governance scholars begin with an analysis of both markets and governance failures to challenge the conventional wisdom that regulation must involve top-down command-and-control rules. Instead they attempt to offer a third-way vision between unregulated markets and top-down government controls."
19. For a reflection on the present transformation, see, for example, Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the Legal Infrastructureliterature 25 have been charged with being "overzealous" 26 because these attempts invite a level of generalization that threatens to ignore important differences between the literatures. In this way, new governance is like critical legal theory 27 -and legal realism for that matter 28 -in the sense that, although a number of authors can be identified as being under the conceptual umbrella, the nature of the movement as a whole defies an all-inclusive definition. 29 That being said, it is safe to assert that new governance is the study of the ways in which governments release their authority to regulate, or to enforce regulation, within regulated spaces, 30 allowing nongovernment organizations to share in providing administrative functions traditionally associated with government. 31 Accordingly, new governance may become the newest champion of "embedded liberalism." 35 New governance literature today appears hopeful of the "reassertion of the public interest" within governance. 36 Instead of framing the issue just 37 within the context of the "turn to the market," 38 the "withdrawal of the welfare state," 39 or the "welfare state retrenchment," 40 new governance provides a place to imagine the reconstituting, 41 restructuring, 42 reasserting, 43 or the rise 44 of the public dimension of governance function. This appears to be the essential promise of new governance: to provide an alternative that is not antibusiness, 45 yet still attempt to balance the demands of markets with the interests of society in a way that generates both sustainable and balanced policy options and a governance mechanism that stabilizes wealth creation, protects human dignity, and ensures a habitable natural environment for future 35 37. Of course, this is not to take away from the important "turn to the market," "withdrawal of the welfare state," or "welfare state retrenchment" debates. It is only to say that different debates ought to also continue to emerge. Furthermore, the distinction drawn here is a precarious one in the sense that many of the authors of the privatization literature will also have a voice in these other literatures. Braithwaite been largely debunked. 52 Not only has the administrative state grown in size (and expense), 53 but there has also been a vast geographical expansion of regulations in previously unregulated, or less regulated, spaces. 54 Thus, such notions, which framed much of the conversation about the shift from the welfare state for so long, 55 are inaccurate as a description of the evolution of government and governance. 56 Much of the literature on governance that supports, or supported, the evolution of new governance draws on this insight, as will be seen below.
A. Privatization
The privatization literature 57 describes the "withdrawal of the state" as a provider of public services and, in particular, various forms of social insurance. 58 The narrative of privatization is more dramatic and selfapparent in countries such as the United Kingdom (which, during the "Golden Age," had a more robust welfare state than the United States), 59 but it still strongly shapes how many understand this regulatory shift in the United States. 60 Privatization generally refers to the outsourcing of government services 61 -"essential services" 62 -that the state traditionally provided through welfare programs, like the New Deal programs, to for-profit or nonprofit organizations. 63 The rationale for privatization is, in essence, that it improves the efficiency of social services provided by allowing private, usually for-profit, organizations to manage them. 64 By delegating responsibility, governments achieve provision of more services at a decreased expense to the public by allowing free market capitalism to shoulder much of the load. 65 The main claim is that the consumers of these services receive better quality and variety of products, as well as potentially lower prices generated by the efficiency gains from market competition. 66 These efficiency gains increase the profitability of providing services and boost economic growth, ultimately leading to more financially stable economies. 67 Economic growth increases the tax base, and these gains made by governments are then passed down to taxpayers, reducing the overall tax burden. 68 Low taxes leave more money in the economy, further increasing economic growth. 69 In the end, taxpayers enjoy lower tax burdens, consumers enjoy better services, employees benefit from a better economy, and governments can channel resources with more focus on a narrower range of functions. 70 Unfortunately, this theory has already proven too good to be true. Policies have modified privatization by applying it in a more incremental, experimental, and responsive manner 71 than the initial enthusiasm encouraged by the failed "Washington Consensus." 72 Still, skepticism remains as to whether privatization can be implemented in a manner that adequately offsets risks to the public interest in delegating discretion over the management of large segments of society to for-profit actors. 73 The issue of how to exploit the benefit of privatization while mitigating its risks is a central struggle within the new governance literature. others, 77 Berle made assumptions about natural hazards and manufactured risks and how they related to science and its technologies. However, these proved to be overly optimistic, simplistic, 78 and more problematic than anticipated. 79 Anthony Giddens suggests that the manufacturing of uninsurable risk by progress, and not the financial cost of the welfare state, led to state retrenchment. 80 The state was unable to devise a way to use regulatory architecture to solve the problems created by progress. 81 Faced with this, governments were caught between a rock and a hard place: the social experiment of using the welfare state to mitigate the dangers of progress was unworkable, and the prospect of reverting to a pre-progress, pre-industrial society was similarly impractical. Thus, the social contract, which obliged the state to mitigate the social and environmental risks caused by industrialization, was in breach. 82 The state could not meet these lofty commitments. As a result, the first project of "embedded liberalism" was a failure and the state retreated. 83 From this perspective, the welfare state model proved unable to adequately identify risks or adequately devise solutions that did not manufacture new risks and greater complexity. 84 This inability left "the path of progress" 85 highly uncertain, 86 and this uncertainty ultimately led to the demise of the welfare state and to the rise of privatization. 87 With 91 In other words, governments are at a loss as to how to solve the challenges they face. As a result, they outsource responsibilities to the private sector and focus squarely on improving efficiency of the remaining regimes of practice within their purview of power to maintain legitimacy. 92 As long as governments operate with a legitimate measure of accountability (a calculus of risk management and economic efficiency), 93 the larger issue of whether such government initiatives promote the long-term sustainability of society can be shadowed by technocratic narratives. 94 Thus, governments limit their function and fixate on the efficiency of their internal control systems as a measure of performance. Accounting scholar Michael Power details how technocratic narratives "have filtered into regulatory organizations [providing] a blueprint for the governance and accountability of the regulatory decision process." 95 Power also agrees with the above-mentioned thinkers in this area that such patterns of reflexive government are leading to a new and potentially dangerous political economy. 96 
B. Risk Society and Reflexive Government

C. Decentered Regulation
The decentered literature covers a broad spectrum of ideology from neoclassical economic thinkers, such as Milton Friedman 97 103 Historical narratives focused on their work have explained that governments, with the United States and United Kingdom leading the way, privatized and deregulated their regulatory models. 104 Top-down, command-and-control regulatory techniques were abandoned, and "free markets" were unleashed. 105 "Free markets," rhetoric aside, mean regulators create more discretionary, process-based regulation of markets and society, which allows private actors-generally for-profit actors-to exercise more discretion within regulated spaces. 106 One of the foundational claims of this neoclassical academic and political movement was that the "man on the spot" enjoyed the most intimate vantage point, and this helped him understand complex society. 107 For this reason, some assumed that with the aid of the price mechanism, the "man on the spot" was in the best position to make decisions in regulated spaces. 108 For instance, Hayek would likely suggest that Goldman Sachs does not need a centralized public bureaucracy to operate within the global economy. Goldman Sachs is the "man on the spot," having the most intimate knowledge of the ever- changing information it must balance in its decisionmaking processes.
As for the knowledge Goldman Sachs lacks, Hayek would argue that no actor enjoys perfect knowledge, but the price mechanism adequately supplements these limits by providing information about other market actors. 109 The "man on the spot" is plugged into the knowledge of the facts on the ground. As such, groups of these actors are collectively, from various decentralized locations, in the best positions to exercise governance discretion, since each has an intimate knowledge of the small segment of the regulated space in which each operates. 110 Consequently, by exploiting the power of information exchange technologies (such as the price mechanism, 111 knowledge brokers, and auditing and reporting processes 112 ), regulators can create "knowledge networks," 113 which provide decentered actors the additional information they need to coordinate activities, and accordingly govern society.
This sort of thinking emphasizes that an important dimension of an effectively regulated space is the willingness of those regulated to respect, follow, and actively participate (to the best of their ability) as partners in the regulatory process. 114 In fact, such governance strategies are regarded as dependent on the information that exchanges between regulators and the regulated to learn of and respond to complex regulatory challenges in a timely and effective manner 115 or, more dramatically, simply to avoid regulatory failure. Since such information exchanges between actors within a regulated space need to be effective, maintaining nonadversarial relationships is given a top priority to facilitate communication, coordination, and learning. 116 The problem is that this priority can hamper meaningful enforcement mechanisms in some cases as the regulator becomes fearful that paternalistic punishment of the regulated may undermine their partnership, thus compromising the information exchanges within the regulated space. 117 This places the regulator in a dilemma: if it wishes to have effective information exchanges so as to have the best possible knowledge about a regulated space, then it must not enforce such regulation with vigor because it may alienate the regulated, on whom it relies to inform it about changes in the regulated space. 118 On the other hand, if a regulator does not enforce its regulations, or has regulations without "real teeth," then the regulated may not take the "law" of the regulated space seriously, 119 creating new informal norms, which can dictate how the regulated space functions and can thus compromise the regulator's intentions. 120 From this perspective, governance is a channeling of discretionary authority from government agencies to more hybrid and decentered public-private governance processes, 121 in the hope of establishing social relationships with "the man on the spot." 122 This channeling is deemed necessary to exploit decentered decisionmaking through information exchange technologies. 123 This results in the replacement of substancebased, state-imposed regulation with process-based, public-private coregulation and co-governance. Governments restrict their function to devising strategic plans for regulated spaces (called steering), leaving a large portion of the application, monitoring, and enforcement of these strategies (called rowing) to nonstate actors. 125 As a result, regulation is becoming intimately linked to other ordering processes such as markets, civil society networks, and the internal control and risk management mechanisms of corporate governance. 126 In theory, the state creates the steering rules, but in practice this is only partly true since private participation in strategic rulemaking is becoming more common in regulated spaces. 127 Consequently, the distinction between steering and rowing is blurred. 128 When looking at such regulation, for instance the California Occupational Safety and Health Act Cooperative Compliance Plan, 129 it is not so easy to draw a distinction between the Act's regulations (steering) and the rules emerging from the regulated (rowing). 130 Many of the rowing norms are also strategic and steering in nature. The blurring between external institutional norms (strategic steering regulations) and internal organizational norms (operational rowing norms) demonstrates that the differentiation between who is steering and who is rowing is not so clear. 131 In such heterarchically regulated spaces, assumptions cannot be made regarding which norms, control mechanisms, and regulatory participants are, in fact, directing the evolution of regulatory norms at any given time. 132 Upon reflection, one might pause and conclude that this evolution of heterarchically regulated spaces is a sign of publicization; however, that might be premature. Without any empirical evidence that these for-profit private 125 . See Levi-Faur, supra note 23, at 15-16. 126. To be clear, although state law will always be present within post-statist regulatory processes, it becomes a question of whether the law is steering these regulatory processes or whether these regulatory processes are steering themselves.
127. See Harter, supra note 20, at 414-22 (identifying the considerable benefits yielded from the collaboration of private and public actors in creating policy).
128. 
D. Conclusion
Faith in the reassertion of the public interest within governance appears in works of conscientious governance theories like those of Braithwaite and Freeman, suggesting that a counterbalance to privatization is occurring. 146 The hope is that, as the bright-line distinction between public and private blurs further, some of the rationalities that legitimate profitmaking on the cusp of legality 147 will be brought under more scrutiny by the "unwieldy" public 148 and academics, 149 resulting in for-profit actors becoming more societally minded.
Linguistically, regulatory scholars have introduced the language of "public-private partnership" 150 and "governance" 151 into the lexicon of discourse. Politically, a "double movement" 152 against privatization and deregulation has increased support globally for greater accountability of for-profit actors. 153 Vocationally, a strong corporate social responsibility discourse has entered into many top U.S. business schools. 154 But functionally, there is scant evidence to support the claim that for-profit actors are assuming the role of public servants, and yet faith in the publicization of for-profit activities within governance remains strong. 155 This, in part, exposes a fragility in the new governance project: the potential that the hope of publicization makes privatization more palatable, but no less threatening to public interest.
So, is this faith in publicization misplaced? Jody Freeman's account of publicization assumes that private actors promise to uphold "traditionally public goals," because this is "the price" governments demand in order for these private actors to have access to these "lucrative opportunities." 156 Does privatization play out under these conditions? Are governments generally in the position to make such demands? Short of having to cope with a political crisis of catastrophic proportions, are governments willing and able to reverse privatization initiatives merely because they are disappointed with the performance of private actors?
Some suggest not, arguing that the state withdrew from being a service provider because it could not afford to provide such services. 157 This is a story of governments amassing debt in a manner that no financially prudent and socially conscious citizen with an eye to the welfare of the next generation could tolerate, 158 so they were forced to privatize. This would not appear to be a situation in which private actors would be fearful that a government might reverse privatization, if private actors failed to uphold traditionally public goals.
That said, this financial justification for state withdrawal may not be altogether convincing, considering that, in the U.S. context, every administration, both Democratic and Republican, since the Reagan Administration has increased the national debt. 159 In fact, the Reagan Administration, which to many represents the model for fiscal responsibility, did not decrease the overall national debt during its two terms. 160 Either way, considering the massive amount of national debt in the United States, it appears unlikely that private actors need be too fearful that the government will reverse privatization-at least in the U.S. context.
Placing the issue of financial capacity to one side, both the risk and decentered regulation literatures suggest that governments cannot reverse privatization because government experts alone cannot determine how to regulate society. In short, governments need privatization-or at least private actors-to participate in exercising governance discretion from various decentralized locations because, as the decentered governance literature suggests, these actors possess an intimate and detailed knowledge of a segment of the regulated space, which government actors need to effectively understand and manage society. 161 Thus, the idea that publicization is the price that governments demand for private actors to have access to "lucrative opportunities" may not be accurate. The more frightening possibility, and possibly the more accurate one, is precisely the opposite: privatization is the price that private actors demand to allow for governments to govern adequately. corporation and the law that regulates it. This section introduces a number of them. Although this section presents each of these ideas in a largely uncontested manner, there are, of course, minority voices that contest them. 162 That said, corporate legal scholars in the U.S. context tend to be more conservative than their European counterparts. Thus, American academics see many of the ideas presented below as commonsense positions. This position, on consideration, ought to make one pause to seriously consider, or reconsider, whether Corporate America is well suited or willing to assume the social responsibilities that a publicization of the corporation would entail.
II. THE GATES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. The Lex Mercatoria
At its core, free market ideology suggests that if societies strive toward the ideal free market, many of today's social problems would be closer to being alleviated. 163 Although many accept this without much investigation, the notion is rooted in the story of the medieval European merchant order. 164 This order existed beyond state law. 165 Accordingly, it was developed through custom and best practice. 166 Merchants developed and administered their own laws, and the state rarely interfered. 167 To many, it is a shining example of a period of a purer private ordering in which market mechanisms and social norms 163. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 201-02 ("I believe that we shall be able to preserve and extend freedom. . . . But we shall be able to do so . . . only if we persuade our fellow men that free institutions offer a surer . . . route to the ends they seek than the coercive power of the state."); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE WITH POWER AND MARKET 1366 (2d ed. 2009) ("The more the market principle prevails in a society, therefore, the greater will be that society's freedom and its prosperity.").
164. López Rodríguez argues that during the Middle Ages, and for the following hundreds of years, uniform commercial rules were enforced through "the market tribunals 165. It is suggested that these medieval uniform rules did not have the "benefit of state enforcement of contracts," but slowly "evolved their own private code of laws," which were enforced by a "local official or a private merchant." Paul R. governed and society flourished. 168 This story of lex mercatoria (merchant law) celebrates the past prowess and future potential of the free market. Although this story is not historically accurate, it still establishes a "common ground" for the proponents of the free market. 169 It is used as the model solution to solve social problems. 170 Free market champions hold this image of the free market in their minds-and hearts-when they advocate for the protection of the freedom of contract, the inalienability of property, and minimal government intervention. 171 Their arguments hint that a world without government is possible and desirable. 172 Their views reflect a deep mistrust of government 173 and a conviction that market function can spontaneously order complex society effectively. 174 At the core of this free market ideology is the suggestion that the hand of equity, of government intervention, and of publicization is unnecessary because the visible hand of the market will provide equity if markets are allowed to operate freely. Meritocracy will take care of the rest. 175 This faith in free market ideology loosely underpins much of corporate governance thinking.
B. Corporate Law as Merely Protector of the Market Mechanism
Much of corporate legal scholarship regards corporate law as the protector of the freedom of contract and the inalienability of property. Many think that, by simply protecting these fundamentals of market function, corporate law ensures that corporate management will be driven by competition to constantly strive for lower transaction costs and, as a result, greater efficiency within the corporation. 176 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel explained that unlike administrative law, in which the discretion of administrative officials needs to be tightly constrained, corporate law does not have to police corporate managers in the same way. 177 The reason is that there is already an enforcement mechanism in place-the market. 178 If corporate managers do not do their jobs, then corporate profits decrease, which affects share price and results in ex ante contractual penalties for the managers. 179 These penalties potentially include a decrease in the value of stock options, termination of employment, damage to reputation, and acquisition. 180 For the market mechanism to enforce efficient internal order within corporate governance, corporate law need only address the issues related to agency between shareholders and management-to be clear, corporate law need only ensure that corporate managers have one "master": shareholders. 181 The market mechanism will do the rest. Otherwise, if corporate law directs corporate managers to have loyalties to both the investor and the community, the law would free managers from the discipline of the market, opening up the opportunity for them to serve neither. 182 An idea that accompanies this thinking is that, for regulators to police corporate behavior, they need only harness the market. For instance, if a regulator imposes a large enough fine for a violation of a regulation, the regulator will have made effective use of the firm's strength. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, the firm's strength is in its ability to calculate risks and rewards, and, thus, imposing such a fine will effectively prevent violation of the regulation. 183 Of course, this regulatory solution is not nuanced-effectively enforcing large fines against corporations-but it does provide an adequate rationale to protect the operation of the market mechanism within corporate governance. This is what is really at stake for corporate legal scholars like Easterbrook and Fischel-economic accountability to shareholders, not social responsibility. With this solution to regulatory challenges, the status quo corporate structure remains. In theory, the corporation is still encouraged to "maximize wealth" creation, 184 alter behavior without reforming corporate law. 185 This arrangement leaves "managers free to maximize the wealth of the residual claimants [shareholders] subject to the social constraints." 186 Upon reflection, Easterbrook and Fischel clearly established the public-private distinction within corporate law, explaining precisely where the iron gates against government intervention within corporate law ought to be constructed-at its very border. Most corporate legal scholars agree with Easterbrook and Fischel that corporate law best serves society as an economizing device that facilitates wealth creation and encourages corporate management to keep transaction costs low and profits high. 187 
C. Corporate Law as the Product of the Market Mechanism
In 1974, William Cary argued that states were competing to attract corporations to increase state revenues. 188 He thought that this was creating a dangerous "race to the bottom" for corporate governance standards. 189 He suggested that Delaware, in particular, created corporate governance standards that favored managerial interests because corporate managers tended to be the incorporators, and the state's budget was dependent on revenues from corporations. 190 As a consequence, state competition for corporations was resulting in managers enjoying broad and unchecked authority, resulting in lessthan-optimal corporate performance. 191 In 1977, Ralph Winter wrote a reply to Cary, rejecting his position by arguing that state competition should "tend toward optimality so far as the shareholder's relationship to the corporation is concerned" and, thus, corporate governance standards, like those of Delaware, "are optimal legal arrangements." 192 He agreed with Cary that corporate management ultimately had the consumer power over incorporation but argued that managers would select corporate law that reduced transaction costs and led to more profitable business organizations. Thus, state competition produced an optimal corporate law regime. 194 Put differently, what Cary regarded as a "race-to-the-bottom," Winter regarded as a "race-to-the-top." 195 This debate has had a number of reincarnations, 196 and Winter's position has consistently won the debate, creating the impression that corporate law is not a product of politics, but the product of market forces. 197 Even though recent empirical evidence suggests that other states simply do not compete with Delaware for its primacy over incorporations for publicly held corporations in the United States, 198 the perception that U.S. corporate law is the product of market demands and competition between states still persists. 199 When combined with the other normative messages addressed above, one can appreciate that many corporate legal thinkers are convinced that a corporate law shaped by market forces would lead to an optimal regime and that any political meddling, such as an attempt to publicize corporate governance, would be rejected out of hand as, at best, suboptimal and, at worst, as radical, unworkable, and blindly naïve.
D. The Corporation as a Nexus of Contracts
As regards corporate legal theory, it is important to stress from the outset that the concession theory, the entity theory, and the aggregate contractarian theory 200 always inform the legal understanding of the corporation. 201 This is because the modern corporation has always been 202 a group of aggregate constituents 203 connected through contract, 204 while at the same time, the corporation is an entity with personhood that only exists because of a concession made by the state. 205 Today, in the U.S. legal context, the corporation is generally thought of in terms of a version of a theory overbalanced with a contractarian understanding of the corporation, 206 which is captured by the nexus-ofcontracts theory. 207 This article calls this the aggregate contractarian theory.
This imbalance within U.S. corporate theory conveys an understanding of the corporation as a set of consensual and efficient contracts that bind corporate constituents. 208 This version of corporate theory suggests that a high level of efficiency occurs between corporate constituents because relaxed legal requirements allow market forces to inspire them to optimally negotiate contracts to satisfy their own interests. 209 Since this arrangement is regarded as the best option for the corporation as an economizing device, 210 it follows that corporate law must remain permissive, rejecting mandatory legal rules as generally suboptimal. 211 On closer inspection of corporate governance, this theory suggests that large, sophisticated investors play a central role in making corporate governance work within this legal market framework. 212 In theory, professional investors and their consultants provide analysis of corporate management, governance structures, debt-equity ratios, and relative prowess when compared to competitors, 213 which supplies the price mechanism with enough information for debt and equity markets to reward good corporate practice and punish poor performance. 214 Thus, just as Easterbrook and Fischel suggested, what emerges is a corporate law that allows markets to function competently, encouraging "what is optimal for the firms and investors." 215 Within this aggregate contractarian theory, fair treatment of corporate constituents is rationalized as follows. If a corporate constituent does not like the terms of a proposed contract with a corporation, it can negotiate for new terms, demand a higher price for contracting, or choose not to enter into a contract with the corporation in question. 216 It is a consensual relationship. 217 If a constituent (shareholder) is unhappy and markets are highly liquid, the constituent can "exit" the relationship. If enough shareholders exit, this will decrease share value and trigger a reason for management to prevent further exits, thereby policing managerial opportunism. 218 Furthermore, the cost of contracting will encourage corporate managers to make choices that balance the transaction costs of making a decision between all of the constituents affected. 219 In this way, a contract enforces a balance of power between constituents, for although corporate managers have much of the ex ante authority, 220 the contractual ex post consequences discipline such discretionary behavior. 221 rules when incorporating that balance the transaction costs of deviating from the off-the-rack default rules of incorporation with the perceived benefit of doing so. 222 Such freedom of rule selection allows the corporate form to have greater flexibility to respond to market demands and opportunities. 223 That said, some mandatory obligations are imposed on directors and management in an attempt to counter the inherent potential for power and/or information asymmetries between actors within corporate hierarchies. 224 But generally speaking, such mandatory rules are discouraged, since most are deemed to be unnecessary, and because the cost of electing to adopt choices that obviously disadvantage shareholders or creditors is so high that these choices become de facto mandatory; the market disciplines, while still leaving discretion for dynamic, entrepreneurial decisionmaking options. 225 This aggregate contractarian perspective also discourages courts from attempting to compensate ex post facto for any ex ante errors in negotiating. If constituents of the corporation fail to negotiate for the risks involved in a particular contractual relationship, courts should just leave it to the market to police. 226 Thus, from this perspective, the role of the courts ought to be as follows: "The courts may not rewrite [corporate contracts] under the guise of relieving one of the parties from the hardship of an improvident bargain. The Court cannot protect the parties from a bad bargain and it will not protect them from bad luck." 227 In this light, corporate law, and its judicial application, appears somewhat insensitive to the inequalities between contracting parties. It is hesitant to impose a stricter standard than freedom of contract, since doing so might inadvertently undermine market discipline and, therefore, the corporation as an economizing device. 
E. Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Law
In the classic corporate social responsibility of the Berle-Dodd debate of the 1930s, the issue was whether corporate power ought to be in the hands of shareholders as public interest representatives or managers as stewards of society. 229 In the 1980s and 1990s, the shift from corporate social responsibility (direct social obligation) to corporate responsibility (indirect social obligation through wealth creation) is captured by Easterbrook and Fischel's classic one master theory: if managers are only accountable to shareholders as investors, the market will force corporate responsibility (profitmaking). 230 If managers are burdened by split loyalties, the door is open for managerial opportunism, and, accordingly, wealth production is compromised. 231 Such interference, it was claimed, could easily jeopardize profits, which would have a net negative impact on all constituents within these organizations, because the capacity to generate wealth would be sacrificed in a blind attempt to achieve fairness. 232 From this perspective, by producing wealth, managers are most responsible to society. 233 As mentioned, Easterbrook and Fischel suggested that using regulations, other than corporate law, to cultivate markets that better deal with price uncertainties 234 would be the best way to circumscribe corporate for-profit activities without undermining the corporation as an economizing device. 235 For instance, if a regulator wants to prevent a corporation from releasing pollutants into a river, it should not change corporate function through reforming corporate law; rather, it should create a regulatory mechanism within the Environmental Protection Act for monitoring and fining potential river polluters. If the enforcement mechanism is sound, then no rational market actor will 238 but as champions of investors as a class. 239 As a result, the corporation is understood as a tool, which best serves society when it solely focuses on profitmaking, creating the wealth necessary to allow other segments of society to cope with the world's problems.
F. Conclusion
As this section demonstrates, from the corporate legal perspective today, corporations are neither expected nor encouraged to be imbued with public spiritedness. They are profitmaking organizations that are encouraged to act in a self-interested manner. There are a number of interconnected assumptions that legitimate this perspective. First, the corporation can best serve society by being an efficient wealth creation device. 240 Second, direct legal intervention in corporate governance undermines the efficiency of corporate wealth creation. 241 Third, if managers serve one master-shareholders-then markets can police corporate managers and preserve the efficiency of corporate wealth creation. 242 Fourth, corporate law must therefore enforce shareholder interests within corporate governance. 243 Fifth, corporate law must then almost exclusively engage in agency issues between shareholders and management. 244 Sixth, if regulators want to circumscribe the profitmaking function of corporations, then areas of law other than corporate law must be employed to change the price of doing business that corporations face. 245 As a result, most corporate legal scholars view corporate law as legitimate when it serves as a conservative mechanism to avoid public interference and regulatory reform.
This conservative corporate law perspective is the dominant mindset of U.S. corporate legal culture. Although there are always dissenting opinions, this is the commonsense position in the business world. Regulators would face serious resistance if they attempted to experiment with corporate law in ways that might compromise the corporation as an economizing device. 246 So, what about new governance's hope of "publicization of the private?" Its legitimacy has not been established. Moreover, it appears clear that publicization stands in the face of what is deemed to be the commonsense position within corporate governance thinking.
III. THE NARRATIVE OF ENTRENCHED PRIVATIZATION
From a different perspective than what was outlined in the last section, this section reconnects to the idea of technocratic narratives, and suggests that governance narratives possess an additional quality that tends to discourage publicization. This quality is a lack of humanistic narratives, which can divorce decisionmaking from what is at stake, namely the violent consequences of that particular decision on a segment of society. 247 To explain this quality, this article draws a distinction between two types of narratives: humanistic narratives and technocratic narratives. This article defines humanistic narratives as storylines with identifiable characters and a time sequence, which reveal the causes and consequences of characters' actions. Humanistic narratives grant the readers/listeners a digestible message that mirrors life experience. On the other side of the distinction are technocratic narratives, which this article defines as accounts used by technical experts and professionals who seek to employ a spectrum of scientific methodologies, but most predominately economic ones, in an attempt to resolve governance issues.
Mae Kuykendall, in her article about the lack of strong narratives in corporate governance, chooses to label technocratic narratives as "discourses" and humanistic narratives as just narratives. 248 She argues that corporate law lacks the sort of narratives "that attract human interest," even though the corporation is a significant site of "human activity." 249 Accordingly, although one might expect humanistic narratives, they are rarely present or employed within corporate governance. Kuykendall further notes that technocratic narratives in corporate governance generally rely on economic analysis of corporate interactions, which has the sanitizing effect of obscuring the social costs of particular choices. 250 David Westbrook agrees, 251 adding that such lack of humanistic narratives fails to provide corporate governance with heroes that inspire virtue. 252 One can clearly appreciate that this lack of humanistic narratives is damaging to the hope of publicization. Yet, the situation may be even more alarming when one takes into account the effects of technocratic narratives on governance more broadly. For instance, Kerry Rittich suggests that the problems identified by corporate scholars, such as Kuykendall and Westbrook, might reach beyond corporate governance to impact public administrative agencies as well. 253 By the twentieth century, enlightened modern thinkers were painfully aware of the loss of normative certainty that accompanied accepting Nietzsche's thesis that the understanding of good was historically contingent. 254 Without normative certainty, decisionmakers grasped for the scientific method, which promised to reveal the "real issues at stake" by providing social facts on which sound regulatory frameworks could be constructed. 255 This legitimated decisionmaking functions in a manner that mere power or politics could not. The employment of social sciences by administrative agencies to solve social problems in this manner has been called functionalism.
Reflecting on the work of John Willis, Rittich argues that functionalism was successful in the New Deal era because it provided "a way to depoliticize the process of adjudication and diffuse the conflicts among the courts, the executive, and the legislature." 256 During the interwar period in England, functionalists, such as Willis, defended the expansion of the modern administrative state, which was striving to meet the public's demands for greater state involvement in English society. 257 As Martin Loughlin explains:
The functionalist style offered an alternative way of addressing the issues that were presenting themselves for resolution as matters of public law. It was therefore a practical, reformist approach, offering solutions to a variety of legal challenges facing modern government and spanning the range from institutional reforms to alternative modes of interpretation and methods of legal reasoning. This practical program of law reform was directly tied to the broader political movement encompassed under the broad heads of new liberalism, social democracy, progressivism, or democratic socialism. 258 The British functionalist movement paralleled that of American Legal Realists, embracing governance by teams of experts, who could use their mastery of science to determine what was best for society. 259 John Dewey rejected this expert paternalism, which subsequently made his ideas unfashionable at the time, but he pressed on, insisting that if a "government by experts" did not earnestly consult citizens, then such government could amount to no more than "an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few." 260 He insisted, "the enlightenment must proceed in ways which force the administrative specialists to take account of the needs [of the masses]." 261 But progressives, such as Willis, believed such administrative expertise could determine what was best for citizens, legitimating their authority in the modern world by paving the path to progress with their technical knowledge.
Today, the technocratic mindset of functionalism remains the same; however, as Rittich suggests, its use has changed, supporting the conservative interests it once rivaled. 262 Rittich argues that regulators now measure the performance of their institutions "by the extent to which they further efficient transactions and encourage private-sector activity." 263 She continues, "these objectives, in turn, are typically understood to involve creating the legal infrastructure that furthers the interests of investors and capital holders through, inter alia, enhanced protection for property and contract rights." 264 Rittich describes an emerging power structure for governance in which "[c]adres of technocrats and professionals . . . set the terms and conditions under which states, markets, civil society groups, and individuals interact." 265 This has led some to agree, in retrospect, that Dewey's rejection of expert paternalism 266 may have deserved greater credence at the time.
The dangers of technocratic narratives have been clearly echoed by other scholars. On the more radical end of the spectrum is David Harvey. Harvey regards this problem of technocratic narratives as reaching far beyond legal discourse. He views such narratives as part of a conscious campaign over communication to create a "hegemonic discourse," which is propagated through mass media-in particular, the entertainment industry. 267 In Harvey's opinion, this hegemonic discourse has already corrupted "ways of thought and political-economic practices to the point where it is now part of the commonsense way we interpret, live in, and understand the world." 268 Thus, from his Marxian perspective, such narratives are powerful examples of how capitalists have adapted and reasserted their ideology so as to once again lure the proletariat into undermining their own interests. Harvey believes this to be one of the central achievements of the neoliberal movement. 269 Like Harvey, Rittich suggests that ideology is corrupting governance, using a scientific and technical language that appears depoliticized but, in fact, limits choices within the "regulatory calculus" to those that embrace "efficiency, expertise, and cost-containment." 270 In this way, humanistic narratives are regarded as unsuitable and are thus marginalized within decisionmaking. Rittich's argument demonstrates how technocratic narratives depoliticize and dehumanize social conflicts by divorcing them from the personal and necessarily political humanistic narratives in the name of the scientific method.
What is dangerous about this dehumanization of narratives is that social conflicts can be abstractified, practically concealing the connection between particular choices and the violent consequences of that particular course of action on a segment of society. Thomas Nagel brings home this last point when he writes: "Once the door is opened to calculations of utility . . . the usual speculations . . . can be brought to bear to ease the consciences of those responsible for a certain number of charred babies." 271 What the positions of Kuykendall, Harvey, and Rittich all have in common is the lament over the underlying ideology that has presently captured technocratic narratives. They each highlight, in different ways, how technocratic narratives guide their users to prioritize economic needs over social needs when it is necessary to choose between the two. As Harvey pointed out, the normative message that economic needs must always be the priority over all others presents itself as commonsense, radicalizing any suggestion to the contrary. 272 Kuykendall's approach inspires meaningful discourse between ideological adversaries, since it allows for a critical reflection on particular communication without heightening the distinction between such adversaries. One can imagine that approaching such a discourse like an embattled proletariat would probably prove to be less than successful. Kuykendall approaches sensitive issues with tact, so as not to alienate a corporate legal audience, which usually tends to be conservative. Consider Kuykendall's diplomacy in the following passage:
The absence of [humanistic] narrative from corporate law is substantially explained by the nature of the undertaking of producing wealth and by the social formation of business. project of generating wealth does not produce rich human stories. 273 Kuykendall's approach does not point fingers at capitalists and the cadres of technocrats whom Harvey would suggest are operating behind the scenes to control societies. As a result, the chance of constructive bipartisan debate, as well as the potential emancipation from a particular mindset, becomes more likely, since criticism can be deftly directed at a normative level rather than a more personal one. In fact, her article sparked broad debate in the corporate legal community, resulting in a symposium at Michigan State University College of Law entitled the Business Law and Narrative Symposium. 274 In conclusion, the problem of a lack of humanistic narrative appears not to be isolated to private governance (corporate governance), but also appears to seriously threaten public governance (administrative agencies) as well. Again, publicization suggests that there will be the "percolation" of values from public governance to private governance. 275 So, if this percolation process transports values from public to private, what happens when there needs to be a publicization of the public as well? In other words, what if privatization has been so invasive within governance that public governance no longer imbues Braithwaite's "public law values"? Or, what if it never did? The above account suggests that this might be the case. And if this is the case, then the project of new governance might be even more dangerously optimistic than this article suggests.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to dash the hopes of those who quell their fear of privatization with the faith that the clouds shall part and corporate doves imbued with the twin virtues of benevolent kindness and efficiency shall save us all from the woes of modern governance. Based on the literatures reviewed, there is little merit in hoping that this will occur. The blurring of public and private in governance today will not lead to the publicization of corporations in some spontaneous way-to think otherwise amounts to magical thinking.
That said, magical thinking has an important role in the cultivation of ideology. Those that champion privatization have the "foundation myth" of the medieval lex mercatoria 276 -the promise of a pure free market that can shepherd a commoditized humanity through the wonders of the price mechanism. 277 If this is so, then does the myth of publicization create an appropriate counterview of social order, adequately challenging the vision of a pure free market and legitimating opposition to it? A better myth is possible.
There needs to be more emphasis on social justice, 278 equality, 279 and the socioeconomic impacts of privatization. 280 Maybe there needs to be a louder campaign that stresses an understanding of privatization through the lens of human rights, 281 which asserts that international customary law obliges 282 governments to ensure that each of their citizens has the right to dignity, an adequate standard of living, housing, social services, and education. 283 Maybe there also needs to be further declarations that these rights are binding on all nations 284 and, thus, are "not negotiable"! 285 Of course, this is only one of many options, which could coordinate and galvanize the fragmentation of social reaction that Polanyi predicted in his theory of the double movement. 286 That said, human rights framing may also be inadequate. In the face of how countries observe human rights, 287 the hope that states will meet these human rights obligations (in particular social, cultural, and economic rights) 288 is probably as close to becoming reality as a reincarnation of the medieval lex mercatoria. 289 Yet, this human rights framing of the privatization issue provides a stronger "foundation myth" than publicization and a better counter to the present spin of the freemarketeers. Either way, there is more work to be done in Nietzsche's Dark Workshop.
